Popper et le problème du corps et de l’âme
Philosophia Scientiæ January 19, 2026 DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.325 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that physicalism cannot explain rationality, freedom, qualia, or logical standards, and that this failure allows for the possibility of a spiritual nature of the mind. |
Abstract
The mind-body problem is one of the main centers of reflexion of contemporary philosophy. Generally coming from the supposed failure of the Cartesian interactionist dualism, most philosophers of the mind adopt a physicalist ontology. However, according to Popper, this one seems to meet with insuperable difficulties: it can’t give physicalist explanation of rationality and freedom, of qualia; it can’t suggest a satisfactory explanation of the implementation of logical standards. That is why, as Popper explains in The Self and its Brain, materialistic theories of the mind turn into epiphenomenalism or eliminativism. Popper thinks that all these criticisms of materialism allow to conceive the possibility of spiritual nature of the mind.