Popper et le problème du corps et de l’âme
Philosophia Scientiæ January 19, 2026 DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.325 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe mind-body problem remains a central topic in contemporary philosophy. Many philosophers of mind adopt a physicalist ontology, largely due to the perceived failure of Cartesian interactionist dualism. However, Karl Popper argues that physicalism faces insurmountable difficulties: it cannot provide a physicalist explanation of rationality, freedom, qualia, or the implementation of logical standards. According to Popper's work "The Self and its Brain," materialistic theories of mind tend to devolve into epiphenomenalism or eliminativism. Popper contends that these criticisms of materialism open the possibility of conceiving the mind as having a spiritual nature.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that physicalism cannot explain rationality, freedom, qualia, or logical standards, and that this failure allows for the possibility of a spiritual nature of the mind. |
Abstract
The mind-body problem is one of the main centers of reflexion of contemporary philosophy. Generally coming from the supposed failure of the Cartesian interactionist dualism, most philosophers of the mind adopt a physicalist ontology. However, according to Popper, this one seems to meet with insuperable difficulties: it can’t give physicalist explanation of rationality and freedom, of qualia; it can’t suggest a satisfactory explanation of the implementation of logical standards. That is why, as Popper explains in The Self and its Brain, materialistic theories of the mind turn into epiphenomenalism or eliminativism. Popper thinks that all these criticisms of materialism allow to conceive the possibility of spiritual nature of the mind.