The dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: what does philosophy of mind say?
Elie Cheniaux, Carlos Eduardo de Sousa Lyra
Trends in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy May 11, 2016 DOI: 10.1590/2237-6089-2014-0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Filosofia da mente Problema mente-corpo Psicanálise Neurociência |
| Key findings | Only emergentism is compatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. |
Abstract
Objective: To briefly review how the main monist and dualist currents of philosophy of mind approach the mind-body problem and to describe their association with arguments for and against a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.Methods: The literature was reviewed for studies in the fields of psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind.Results: Some currents are incompatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neurosciences: interactionism and psychophysical parallelism, because they do not account for current knowledge about the brain; epiphenomenalism, which claims that the mind is a mere byproduct of the brain; and analytical behaviorism, eliminative materialism, reductive materialism and functionalism, because they ignore subjective experiences. In contrast, emergentism claims that mental states are dependent on brain states, but have properties that go beyond the field of neurobiology.Conclusions: Only emergentism is compatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.