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The hard problem of ‘pure’ consciousness: Sāṃkhya dualist ontology

Karen O'Brien-Kop

Religious Studies May 1, 2024 DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000410 (opens in new tab)

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Drawing on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, a foundational Hindu philosophical text from the fourth century, this article examines the nature of consciousness as separate and autonomous from material reality, including body and mind. Consciousness is described as immortal, plural, individuated, and contentless, and the goal is existential liberation through being situated in pure, non-objective consciousness. The article explores how to understand this claim—whether as a mundane cognitive state producing affective dissociation or as a post-death state—and considers the motivation for engaging with a system whose freedom may only be realized in a dualist reality or after death.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding Argues that Sāṃkhya's dualist conception of consciousness as separate from matter can enrich contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion, resonating with Chalmers's notion of consciousness as fundamental.

Abstract

AbstractThis article addresses the theme of ‘death and immortality’ from the perspective of consciousness, and takes as its starting point a root text of Hindu philosophy, the Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (c. fourth century ce). The text posits a dualist ontology in which consciousness is separate and autonomous from a material reality that includes body and mind. The goal is to be ontologically situated in a ‘pure’ consciousness (non-objective), which signifies existential liberation. There are mundane ways to understand this claim, such as referring to cognitive states that produce affective dissociation, or more radical interpretations, such as a post-death state. This article explores the question of what Sāṃkhya's consciousness is like: it is said to be immortal, plural, individuated, and contentless. What is the motivation for and implication of engagement with a system that describes an existential freedom that may only be known in a dualist reality or after death? And how can Sāṃkhya's concepts be brought into conversation with contemporary investigations into mind–body questions? Sāṃkhya rationality counters the argument of eternal oblivion or of consciousness as an illusion confined to the brain. Yet there are resonances with Chalmers's notion of consciousness as fundamental. This article concludes that contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion can be enhanced by adding Sāṃkhya thought to its purview.

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