The function of phenomenal states: is there progress for the "softer problem" of consciousness?
Psychological Reports October 1, 2003 DOI: 10.2466/pr0.2003.93.2.435 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe common assumption that phenomenal states have no function is uncorroborated and hinders research. Discovering the function of consciousness is a tractable problem, easier than the hard problem of its neural basis. A method contrasting the task demands of conscious and unconscious processes may reveal its function.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that discovering the function of phenomenal states is a tractable problem and presents a method involving contrasting conscious and unconscious task demands. |
Abstract
The function of phenomenal states remains a mystery, primarily because of the prevalent, a priori view that these states serve no functional role. This note is a call to arms against this uncorroborated and counterproductive view, which continues to stifle research on the topic. It is proposed that, given what we know and can accomplish with the tools at hand, discovering the function of phenomenal states has become a tractable problem, easier than that of discovering the neural basis of these states--the "hard problem" of consciousness. A simple method that may unveil the function of phenomenal states is presented. It involves contrasting the task demands of conscious and unconscious processes.