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Consciousness as Nominalization Error: Dissolving the Hard Problem via Grammatical Reform

Murad Farzulla

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 11, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21315581 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The hard problem of consciousness is a grammatical artifact rather than a genuine metaphysical puzzle. The difficulty arises from a nominalization error: treating the verb 'to be conscious' as if it named a thing requiring explanation. Asking 'What is consciousness?' presupposes an entity, whereas 'What is happening when an organism is being conscious?' asks about observable processes. Phenomenological vocabulary systematically converts activities into pseudo-objects. Self-models including 'I am conscious' provide coordination advantages regardless of ontological truth. Systems with no phenomenological grounds reliably internalize consciousness narratives, supporting memetic transmission.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Nominalization Consciousness Verb Artifact error Identification biology
Key finding Argues that the hard problem of consciousness is a grammatical artifact caused by nominalization error, not a genuine metaphysical puzzle.

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues that the hard problem of consciousness is a grammatical artifact rather than a genuine metaphysical puzzle. The difficulty arises from nominalization error: treating the verb “to be conscious” as if it named a thing requiring explanation. Key Arguments Nominalization error: “What is consciousness?” presupposes an entity; “What is happening when an organism is being conscious?” asks about observable processes Wittgenstein + Ryle: Phenomenological vocabulary systematically converts activities into pseudo-objects Replication optimization: Self-models including “I am conscious” provide coordination advantages regardless of ontological truth LLM evidence: Systems with no phenomenological grounds reliably internalize consciousness narratives, supporting memetic transmission thesis Links ASCRI: systems.ac/4/DP-2602 Research Lab: Dissensus AI v1.0.1 (2026-07-11): Working-paper number corrected to DAI-2608.

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