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The strength of weak integrated information theory

Pedro A. M. Mediano, Fernando E. Rosas, Daniel Bor, Anil K. Seth, Adam B. Barrett

Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.04.008 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Cognitive psychology Cognitive science
Citations 109
Key points Argues that distinguishing strong IIT (consciousness identified with specific properties of integrated information maxima) from weak IIT (pragmatic hypotheses linking consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics) widens the theory's appeal and applicability. Contends that existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without committing to all of strong IIT.

Abstract

The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the 'hard problem', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.

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