The structure and bounds of consciousness

Philosophers often consider hypothetical beings that are physically identical to us but lack conscious experience (zombies) or have reversed experiences (inverts). This paper introduces a new hypothetical being, the phenomenal smuggler, which is physically identical to us but has more kinds of conscious experiences. These smugglers raise novel questions about what limits exist on the number or types of extra experiences such a being could conceivably have. The author appeals to five structural features of consciousness—dimensional, precision, combinatorial, syntactic, and integration—to clarify and answer questions about the conceivable upper bounds of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Philosophers often discuss zombies and inverts, hypothetical cases in which perfect physical/functional duplicate of us either lack conscious experience or else have their experiences “shuffled” such that they correlate with different stimuli and physiological states. The idea that there may also be physical/functional duplicates of us who have more kinds of experiences than we do, however, has gone unnoticed. These phenomenal smugglers, as I call them, raise novel questions on what sorts of restrictions there may be on how many or what sorts of extra experiences our smuggler counterparts could conceivably have. I appeal to the dimensional structure, the precision structure, the combinatorial structure, the syntactic structure, and the integration structure of consciousness in order to clarify and answer the questions raised by smugglers about the conceivable upper bounds of consciousness.