Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico
Advances in Consciousness Research August 7, 2012 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.86.19cer (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractAgainst Descartes' rationalism, Vico argues that the clear and distinct idea cannot serve as a criterion of truth for the cogito, because it mistakenly substitutes God's understanding (intelligere) for human thinking (cogitare). Descartes' method of doubt also ignores the essential link between mind and body in humans, and rests on a flawed notion of substance. The article examines these four criticisms and explores what theory of consciousness might be implied by Vico's alternative reflections.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that Vico rejects Descartes' conception of consciousness on four grounds: clear and distinct ideas cannot ground the cogito, they confuse divine and human thought, the method of doubt ignores the mind-body link, and it relies on a wrong notion of substance. |
Abstract
Face to Descartes’ rationalism, in the book entitled De antiquissima Italorum sapientia Vico tries to examine non reflexive aspects of thought. According to Vico, the clear and distinct idea cannot originate the cogito as a criterion of truth; moreover, the clear and distinct idea exchanges the intelligere of God with the human cogitare; third, the method of doubt doesn’t consider the link, in men, of res cogitans and res extensa and the correlation between mind and body. Fourth, this theory arises from a wrong notion of substance. Following these four points, the article will stress the rejection by Vico of the Cartesian idea of consciousness and will try to determine a possible theory of consciousness as it is implied by Vichian reflections. Keywords: Vico; Descartes; consciousness