唯物論は第二の現実など知らない : マックス・ホルクハイマーの弁証法的〈叙述〉

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to investigate dialectic Darstellung (Representation) as a methodological form in Max Horkheimer’s philosophy of the 1930s, and to clarify its internal logic, with a view to reconstructing his theory of knowledge in a comprehensive manner. Based on a literature review of Horkheimer’s theory of knowledge, the paper identifies several underexamined issues. It argues that Horkheimer conceived his philosophical project as an attempt to overcome the “logical necessity” inherent in the social forms that underpinned and constrained the specialized sciences of his time. These social forms not only supported traditional theory of knowledge but also imposed limits on it, thereby shaping the horizon within which theory of knowledge appeared as a necessity. The paper further traces this problem of “logical necessity” to Kant’s concept of the understanding. It shows that Horkheimer regarded this conception as a decisive source of the tendency to accept necessity as a given. Horkheimer was against this “philosophy of consciousness” that accepts this necessity and creates a second reality. Further opposing materialism as an alternative position. On this basis, the paper demonstrates that dialectic “Representation”, conceived as the methodology of a materialist theory of knowledge, is grounded in Marx’s dialectic as an inversion of Hegelian dialectics. It also shows that Horkheimer reconstructs “Representation” around an emancipatory interest. In conclusion, the paper shows that dialectic “Representation”, as a methodological form, operates according to a logic opposed to traditional logical inference and serves to disclose the contradictions inherent in social reality.