PHENOMENOLOGY AND SYMBOL: FROM HUSSERL TO BACHELARD

Abstract

“Blindness” to the problem of the symbol necessarily follows from the main positions of the research \nstrategy of Husserl phenomenology. However, both noema and noesis, as well as the flow of cogitations \nin our minds are initially infected with symbolism, and therefore the project of phenomenological \ndescription needs a “symbolic correction.” The supposed and experienced object is supposed as a symbolically \nfilled object, and the position of the ego describing, constituting, experiencing its object is \nnot only initially infected with cultural symbolism, but also represents the “assemblage point” of any \nphenomenon as a “constellation” formation. Symbolism is initially “embedded” in any phenomenon \nand in any scheme of “pure” consciousness. Correspondingly, the flow of phenomena that can be subjected \nto both noematic and noetic description proceeds according to various “scenarios,” “schemes,” \nwhich are nationally and culturally based, and do not follow the single universal route (Past, Present, \nFuture), which is peculiar only to the new European model of time. This drawback of Husserl’s project \nwas overcome in varying degrees by some phenomenologically oriented philosophers. The author of \nthe article analyzes one of such “symbolic adjustments” by reference to the poetic topology (microphenomenology) \nof poetic image of the Home in the text of French philosopher G. Bachelard.