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Sufficient Presence: A Philosophical Investigation into the Efficacy of Online Psychotherapy and What It Reveals About the Nature of the Therapeutic Bond

M. V. D. Souza

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) April 24, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19737957 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Phenomenology philosophy Modalities Mediation Generative grammar Enactivism Object grammar Integrative psychotherapy Existentialism Psychotherapist Epistemology Therapeutic relationship Cognitive science Embodied cognition
Key points Proposes that the efficacy of online psychotherapy does not refute the ontological foundations of care but reveals the therapeutic bond as a stratified experience with distinct requirements for mediation.

Abstract

This essay departs from an apparent paradox at the center of contemporary clinical psychology: controlled studies consistently demonstrate that psychotherapy conducted through digital means yields clinical outcomes equivalent or comparable to face-to-face modalities across a wide range of mental disorders. Yet phenomenology and enactivism maintain that genuine human bonding requires embodiment, co-presence, and shared vulnerability — conditions that technological mediation fulfills only partially. Rather than resolving this tension by taking sides, the present essay treats it as a philosophical object and proposes a third interpretive path. The central hypothesis is that the documented efficacy of online psychotherapy does not refute the ontological foundations of care; on the contrary, it renders them more complex, revealing that the therapeutic bond is a stratified experience whose layers carry distinct ontological requirements and varying degrees of mediability. The positive clinical outcomes obtained in digital modalities depend on specific conditions that a human therapist — even when present only through a screen — is capable of meeting, and that generative artificial intelligence systems have not yet met. The essay draws on the work of Flückiger et al. (2018), Norcross and Lambert (2019), Merleau-Ponty (1945), Di Paolo (2005), Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009), Tschacher et al. (2014), Feijoo (2021), Insel and Sahakian (2026), and Bienenfeld and Torous (2025), among other