What is Consciousness a Negation of? Jan Patočka’s Contribution to the Existentialism Controversy
Jakub Čapek
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology June 18, 2025 DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2025.2518187 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that Patočka developed a unique existentialist position by grounding consciousness as negation in the Socratic knowledge of not-knowing, diverging from Sartre. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT In the 1940s, Sartre’s philosophy sparked what Merleau-Ponty called the “battle over existentialism”. This article focuses on Jan Patočka’s contribution to this controversy. In his philosophical anthropology in the second half of the 1940s, Patočka sees human existence as defined by the capacity to maintain a distance from what is pre-given (reality of the physical world, established customs and rules of a particular society). Patočka thus exhibited echoes of Jean-Paul Sartre. However, he did not agree with the ethical implication of Sartre’s philosophy, nor with the idea that self-consciousness implies an inner duplication and negation of consciousness itself. Since Patočka still defined consciousness as negation, he had to give a different account of what consciousness is a negation of. This he provided through an existential reading of the Socratic knowledge of not-knowing, thus opening up an original perspective that was not held by anyone else in the discussion over existentialism.