Phenomenological reduction and quantitative psychology: a conflict in the study of self-consciousness.

Abstract

This paper explores the methodological tensions between quantitative psychology and phenomenological reduction in the study of self-consciousness. Quantitative psychology, historically modeled on the natural sciences, treats self-consciousness as a psychological attribute and operationalizes it through standardized scales. It emphasizes causal relationships between self-consciousness and other factors and primarily adopts a third-person perspective. Despite its contributions, this approach faces persistent challenges, including contextual dependence, constructed measurement tools, and the lack of natural measurement units. In contrast, phenomenology, originating with Husserl, emphasizes the intrinsic, pre-reflective dimension of self-consciousness present in all conscious experience. Unlike quantitative psychology, phenomenology contributes by clarifying meaning prior to causal explanation, recognizing the indispensability of the first-person perspective while acknowledging the value of third-person analysis. From the phenomenological standpoint, contextual dependence is not a limitation, and the aim is not to criticize the absence of natural measurement units in quantitative research, but to clarify the true meaning of the scores and the constructed units from the perspective of lived experience.