CE VEDEM CÂND ÎL VEDEM PE OMUL VITRUVIAN DIN SPATE?

The self does not automatically coincide with itself; the command to know oneself implies a gap between the self and its own awareness. This paper explores how identity with oneself can be replaced or substituted within the structure of self-relation, using the image of the Vitruvian Man seen from behind as a symbol. Subjectivity involves more than just having experiences, because even though every experience belongs to a subject, that does not mean the subject experiences itself as the origin of those experiences. The paper reframes the problem of consciousness from whether experience exists to how it is given to itself—either as originating or not. It distinguishes structural reflexivity, which is inherent in conscious experience, from metanoic reflexivity, which creates reflective distance and allows disidentification from substitute forms of self-relation.

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Abstract

The Socratic injunction “know thyself” already suggests that the self may fail to coincide with itself; if such coincidence were immediate, the injunction would be unnecessary. This paper examines how the relation of identity with oneself can appear as substituted within the very structure of self-relation, as articulated through the symbolic figure of the Vitruvian Man seen from behind. Subjectivity is not exhausted by the mere occurrence of experience in consciousness, even if every experience is given for a subject. This structural feature, however, does not guarantee that the self coincides with itself, leaving open the possibility that experience may be lived without being given as originating. Against this background, the paper shifts the problem of consciousness from the existence of experience to the way in which it is given to itself: as originating or not. It distinguishes between structural reflexivity and metanoic reflexivity: the former is immanent to conscious experience, whereas the latter introduces a reflective distance that makes possible a disidentification from substitutive forms of self-relation.