Can we trust the phenomenological interview? Metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological objections
Simon Høffding, Kristian Moltke Martiny, Andreas Roepstorff
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences July 10, 2021 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-021-09744-z (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Metaphysics Phenomenology philosophy Epistemology Interpretative phenomenological analysis Philosophy of science Hermeneutic phenomenology Psychoanalysis Lived experience Social science Qualitative research |
| Citations | 45 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenological interviews are not less reliable or valid than quantitative or experimental methods, and that skepticism about them leads to a problematic 'deep mistrust' that excludes conscious processes from science. |
Abstract
Abstract The paper defends the position that phenomenological interviews can provide a rich source of knowledge and that they are in no principled way less reliable or less valid than quantitative or experimental methods in general. It responds to several skeptic objections such as those raised against introspection, those targeting the unreliability of episodic memory, and those claiming that interviews cannot address the psychological, cognitive and biological correlates of experience. It argues that the skeptic must either heed the methodological and epistemological justification of the phenomenological interview provided, or embrace a more fundamental skepticism, a “deep mistrust”, in which scientific discourse can have no recourse to conscious processes as explananda , with ensuing dire consequences for our conception of science.