Relevance of Embodied Practice to Philosophical Understanding

Meditation can help philosophers step back from the habitual structure of subjectivity that constrains reason. The paper combines recent neurobiological hypotheses with hermeneutic phenomenology to argue that interpretations at the neurobiological level shape our experience of being a subject and the explicit rational understanding that emerges from it. This suggests that embodied practices, which operate before discursive thought, are important for freeing philosophical understanding from hidden assumptions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this paper I argue that meditation has a direct bearing upon philosophical discourse by enabling us to distance ourselves from the basic structure of subjectivity that often limits the scope of reason. Recent neurobiological hypotheses are discussed in conjunction with the method of hermeneutic phenomenology to argue that interpretations on the level of our neurobiology underly and construct our experience of ourselves as subjects and the sense of explicit rational understanding that arises from it. This implies that prediscursive embodied practice can play a crucial role in freeing our philosophical understanding from implicit assumptions.