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Epistemic phenomenology in psychedelic experience

Christopher Kochevar

Synthese November 5, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-025-05340-9 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Philosophy of science Phenomenology philosophy Philosophy of language Metaphysics Consciousness Mood Epistemology
Key points Argues that psychedelic experience is best understood as a modification of familiar cognitive processes, proposing a tripartite framework of fascination, revelation, and improvisation.

Abstract

Psychedelics are being investigated as therapies for major depression and other mood disorders, but the “tripping” experience remains poorly understood. This paper argues that the epistemic dimensions of psychedelic experience should be considered more carefully, both to characterize better the psychedelic state and to develop and explain therapeutic approaches. I propose a tripartite framework for three phenomenological regularities in psychedelic experience—fascination, revelation, and improvisation—and I relate them to everyday epistemic phenomena like curiosity, insight, and intellectual playfulness. I illustrate these regularities with first-person accounts of tripping, and I impact my discussion with a broader model of adaptive cognition, arguing that psychedelic experience, while extraordinary, is best understood as a modification of familiar processes. I conclude with recommendations for new approaches to clinical measurement in psychotherapeutic settings.