Hallucinations and Phenomenal Consciousness

Abstract

This chapter examines whether hallucinations are related to the problem of phenomenal consciousness and how historical contributions to the phenomenology of hallucinations, notably the Early Heidelberg School (1909–1932), shed light on hallucinations in schizophrenia. We focus specifically on Mayer-Gross, who in his phenomenological analysis of hallucinations during psychosis, drew from studies conducted with colleagues in Heidelberg: 1. Hypnagogic experiences (i.e., between waking and sleep); 2. Mescaline as a model-psychosis in the 1920’s with particular relationship to the self-disturbances; 3. Detailed accounts by persons with schizophrenia. In heated debates with colleagues (Berze, Jaspers, C. Schneider, Schröder, Specht, Wernicke) Mayer-Gross concluded that hallucinations in schizophrenia may be considered part of the self-disturbances (later contributing to K. Schneider’s First Rank Symptoms). Shifts in the organization of consciousness play a role. However, hallucinations develop from non-conscious low-level sensory anomalies and a disrupted perception action cycle. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how the Early Heidelberg School contributes to today’s phenomenology of hallucinations.