The article examines the status of the apperceptive “I think” in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The central issue is that the “I think”, on the one hand, functions as a condition of the possibility of cognition, while, on the other hand, it is not itself an object of self-knowledge. This leaves open the question of the sense in which the “I think” can nevertheless be understood positively....
This article is devoted to the problem of the possibility of experience in transcendental idealism. In its classical formulation by Kant, the problem pertains to the correlation between a priori structures of reason and reality. I approach the question of the conditions of the possibility of experience in an alternative way, i.e. as a question about the conditions of its unity, while remaining...
Kant does not provide clear-cut definitions of apperception, consciousness, and self-consciousness and everywhere uses these terms as synonyms, which creates the problem of the relationship between these faculties. The importance of this problem stems from the colossal significance of each of the above-mentioned faculties which are intimately connected with Kant’s formulation of the key tasks...