Mindfulness is widely used and effective, but easily misunderstood in ways that limit its benefits. The concept rests on five seemingly contradictory dialectical positions: activity versus passivity, wanting versus non-wanting, changing versus non-changing, non-judging versus non-reacting, and active acceptance versus passive acceptance. Understanding these paradoxes is necessary for proper application. The article discusses practical implications and potential caveats for medical professionals.
A 1916 novella by Gottfried Benn, 'Brains,' is examined for its relevance to the philosophy of mind. The work is argued to present a materialist and reductionist view of consciousness, where the mind is inseparable from and entirely dependent on the physical brain. The analysis suggests that Benn's literary depiction of a brain as a mere biological organ anticipates later philosophical debates about the mind-body problem, particularly challenging dualist perspectives. The novella's portrayal of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of neural processes is presented as a precursor to contemporary neuroscientific and eliminative materialist positions.
The paper compares two models of disrupted selfhood—hypnagogic and hyper-reflexive—drawing on Kafka's paranoic doubles to explore how self-disturbances manifest in neuropsychiatric disorders and anomalous conscious states. It argues that hypnagogic models emphasize a passive, dream-like fragmentation of the self, while hyper-reflexive models highlight an excessive, self-conscious monitoring that disrupts normal experience. The analysis suggests that both frameworks offer complementary insights into conditions such as schizophrenia, depersonalization, and other altered states, and that Kafka's literary depictions of doubles provide a rich analogy for understanding these neuropsychiatric phenomena.