Embodied embedded cognition and neurophenomenology are gradually gaining influence in cognitive science and neuroscience. This introduction outlines what these approaches entail and previews the papers collected in a special section devoted to them.
Heterophenomenology and neurophenomenology are two different methodologies for studying consciousness. Both appear to allow the same range of experiments, making it difficult to choose between them. Heterophenomenology excludes conclusions drawn by neurophenomenology, so a choice may be necessary. Currently, there are no reasons to reject either methodology as unreliable or invalid, so both should be kept in consideration.
Difficulties in distinguishing genuine reports of experience from confabulations have implications for theories of consciousness. Through an analysis of out-of-body experiences (OBEs), the author argues that no existing or possible evidence could determine whether variations in reports reflect actual differences in experience or are post-hoc confabulations. How evidence is interpreted depends on prior theoretical commitments. Vehicle theories of consciousness, which cannot accommodate confabulations, allow only the hypothesis that reports reflect elaborate phenomenology. Because it is impossible to know that reports are not confabulations, vehicle theories are insufficient to explain OBEs.