ISSN 0897-2346
2 papers in the library · 1 citation · publishing 2010-2025
Southwest Philosophy Review 2025 J. Watson
I argue that a minimal condition of free action, the capacity of an agent to act for a reason, is incompatible with conventional atomic constitutive panpsychism. If fundamental particulars are physical and mental simples, then fundamental particulars cannot possess complex mental representations, including representing an action as for a reason. Options for the panpsychist include Leibnizian...
Southwest Philosophy Review 2010 Clark Butler, Southwestern Philosophical Society 1 citation
The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in...