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Metaphysica

ISSN 1874-6373

2 papers in the library · publishing 2021-2024

Papers

Dualism, the Causal Closure of the Physical, and Philip Goff’s Case for Panpsychism

Metaphysica January 24, 2024 D. Sepetyi

The article examines Philip Goff's panpsychist research program, which aims to explain consciousness's place in the physical world and the intrinsic nature of physical reality while avoiding the causal closure problem that challenges dualism. The author argues that dualism can adequately address the inductive no-gap objection based on causal closure, whereas panpsychism, as presented in Goff's book Galileo's Error, encounters similar difficulties and its ability to overcome them is questionable. The later hybrid cosmopsychism avoids the causal closure issue but relies on assumptions that are hardly intelligible.

Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne-Moreland Argument from Consciousness

Metaphysica April 27, 2021 Ward Blondé, Ludger Jansen

The paper develops a new argument for the existence of God from consciousness that avoids commitment to substance dualism, improving on earlier arguments by Swinburne and Moreland. It addresses the exceptional-point-of-view problem: why a conscious being experiences the point of view of a tiny brain in a vast universe indifferent to which physical entities it produces. The argument suggests that theism offers a better explanation than atheism for this coincidence, without requiring the ontological commitments of substance dualism.