arXiv Preprint Archive
June 22, 2026
Amahury J. López-díaz, Carlos Gershenson
Agency is often invoked in research on philosophy, biology, and cognitive science without a clear account of how it originates from material organization. Building on temporally parametrized (F, A)-systems, this paper develops a graded organizational theory of agency grounded in relational biology, physical biosemiotics, and process ontology. We argue that self-referential closure cannot be...
Journal of the Royal Society, Interface
December 17, 2025
Amahury Jafet López-díaz, Carlos Gershenson
2 citations
This study explores the evolutionary emergence of semantic closure-the self-referential mechanism through which symbols actively construct and interpret their own functional contexts-by integrating concepts from relational biology, physical biosemiotics and ecological psychology into a unified computational enactivism framework. By extending Hofmeyr's (Fabrication, Assembly) systems-a...
arXiv Preprint Archive
May 8, 2013
Tom Froese, Carlos Gershenson, David A. Rosenblueth
The extended mind hypothesis has stimulated much interest in cognitive science. However, its core claim, i.e. that the process of cognition can extend beyond the brain via the body and into the environment, has been heavily criticized. A prominent critique of this claim holds that when some part of the world is coupled to a cognitive system this does not necessarily entail that the part is also...
IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
May 8, 2013
Tom Froese, Carlos Gershenson, David A. Rosenblueth
The extended mind hypothesis has stimulated much interest in cognitive science. However, its core claim, i.e. that the process of cognition can extend beyond the brain via the body and into the environment, has been heavily criticized. A prominent critique of this claim holds that when some part of the world is coupled to a cognitive system this does not necessarily entail that the part is also...