Current accounts of affect in the philosophy of mind, affective neuroscience, and consciousness studies fall into three broad classes — phenomenological, functional, and eliminativist — each presupposing a shared prior assumption that none specifies: that the systems under analysis are bounded, persisting units whose affective states can be coherently analyzed. Adjacent traditions...
Current accounts of affect in the philosophy of mind, affective neuroscience, and consciousness studies fall into three broad classes — phenomenological, functional, and eliminativist — each presupposing a shared prior assumption that none specifies: that the systems under analysis are bounded, persisting units whose affective states can be coherently analyzed. Adjacent traditions...
The four papers collected under this cover develop a structural treatment of affect — what it is, where it sits in the dependency hierarchy of identity-maintaining systems, what follows from that placement for specific contested cases, and what empirical work the framework calls for. The papers can be read independently and collectively; each stands alone, and the four together constitute the...
Current empirical approaches to consciousness rely on measures of integration, responsiveness, and reportability, all of which track relatively late-stage phenomena. This paper introduces a minimal operational criterion for detecting an earlier event: the first sustained instance of recursive closure in neural dynamics. We argue that recursion functions as a constraint-satisfying mechanism...