Abstract: The question of whether human beings genuinely choose or merely experience the effects of antecedent causes remains central to philosophy of action, moral philosophy, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. I argue that this question becomes confused when several distinct concepts are treated as interchangeable: free will, practical choice, freedom from constraint, agency, and the...
Abstract: Intensity has occupied a significant position in modern and contemporary philosophy, particularly in accounts of duration, affect, difference, embodiment, becoming, and material transformation. From Bergson’s analysis of qualitative multiplicity and duration to Deleuze’s ontology of intensive difference, and from phenomenological accounts of lived affectivity to contemporary...
Abstract This paper establishes a fully deductive account of phenomenological lack grounded in diachronic self-identity. I demonstrate that any system satisfying diachronic identity necessarily operates under temporal indexation, which analytically entails the formation of a minimal self-model as a structural requirement of maintaining identity across non-coincident temporal states. From this,...
Abstract Western ontology, from Parmenides to Heidegger, has been persistently fixated on the question of "Being" (Was ist das Seiende?), thereby neglecting the formal mechanisms governing the survival and collapse of meaning-systems. This paper argues for a fundamental reorientation: the foundational question of philosophy should shift from "What is Being?" to "What conditions make the...