Evolutionary arguments alone cannot confirm or falsify hypotheses about consciousness; consciousness science must rely primarily on experimental and observational evidence from humans and other animals alive today. The authors argue against "evolution-first" approaches that treat evolutionary considerations as the primary lens for assessing consciousness. Using Walter Veit's account as an example, they contend such approaches lack compelling empirical support. While evolutionary thinking can help advance consciousness research, it should not be foundational for hypothesis justification, though it may still play a role in hypothesis generation.
The paper argues that the view that biological substrates (as opposed to biological functions) are necessary for consciousness is untenable. It faces a dilemma: if interpreted in an empirically respectable way, it collapses into a biological function view; if interpreted as truly distinct, it becomes empirically intractable and theoretically arbitrary. Therefore, the biological substrate view should be set aside in debates about artificial consciousness. The author suggests that once this view is bracketed, the dispute between biological naturalism and computational functionalism becomes less stark, and progress can focus on identifying which biological or non-biological functions are necessary for consciousness.