Neurophenomenology correlates descriptions of lived experience with brain states, but such correlations alone do not solve the hard problem of consciousness. The interpretation of these correlations requires situating the brain within a living body in the world, placing neuroscience in the context of cognitive science (enaction) and biology (autopoiesis). Three attentional networks distinguish conscious from nonconscious events: orienting to sensory stimulation, activating memory patterns, and maintaining alertness. Phenomenological studies reveal a three-part structure of the present with past and future horizons, linking to cognitive neuroscience findings on minimal time for neural events. Voluntary action is inseparable from consciousness, with neural correlates preceding action and imagination playing a role.
A productive strategy for investigating consciousness compares brain processes that are conscious with those that are not. A related but less explored strategy examines how brain processes transition from unconscious to conscious as individuals develop and across evolution. These transitions occur when brain processes become object to a new, emergent, higher-level subject. The paper reconstructs a minimally-complex subject-object subsystem capable of giving rise to consciousness, suggesting its emergence was driven by coordinating body-environment interactions in real time, such as hand-eye coordination. Conscious processing initially served to organize real-time sensorimotor coordination. Subsequent major transitions include the emergence of conscious mental modelling, which arose from simulations of motor actions used to anticipate consequences, enabling evaluation of alternative responses. The paper predicts further major transitions in consciousness.