Panpsychism, depsychologization of consciousness and the problem of combination
Polylogos January 1, 2025 A. Gusev
Contemporary panpsychist theories of consciousness, which propose that fundamental physical particles have their own primitive forms of experience, face serious conceptual problems that have not been resolved. The combination problem—how micro-experiences combine into unified human consciousness—remains the central challenge. Two leading solutions, Philip Goff's phenomenal bonding hypothesis and Sam Coleman's theory of mental chemistry, both suffer from internal flaws: Goff's proposal relies on a relation that cannot be understood, and Coleman's approach conflicts with basic intuitions about what experience is. The paper argues that panpsychism arises from a misguided depsychologization of consciousness in philosophy, and that the real task is not to invent more speculative theories but to rethink the field's foundational assumptions.