Analytical examinations of subjective experience are hampered by the first-person limitation described by Nagel (1974) in “What is it like to be a bat?”. This comment compares two examinations on the nature of subjective experience: Michael Newall’s (2025) analysis of tetrachromatic colour perception and Jordi Galiano-Landeira and Núria Peñuelas’ (2025) exploration of AI phenomenological...
Molyneux’s problem asks whether a person blind from birth, upon gaining sight, could immediately recognize and distinguish objects by sight alone that were previously known only by touch. Historical and contemporary empirical studies have explored this question with inconclusive results due to empirical limitations. More recently, Held and colleagues (2011) found that treated congenitally blind...
Panpsychism posits that mental properties are fundamental, potentially extending consciousness to AI. Arvan and Maley (2022) recently challenged this notion, asserting that AI, being digital, cannot achieve coherent phenomenal macroconsciousness due to the fact that digital representations miss information between the representation and the representee. Their reasoning hinges on the...