The dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: what does philosophy of mind say?
Trends in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy May 11, 2016 Elie Cheniaux, Carlos Eduardo de Sousa Lyra
The paper reviews how major monist and dualist philosophies of mind approach the mind-body problem and evaluates their compatibility with a closer dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. Interactionism, psychophysical parallelism, epiphenomenalism, analytical behaviorism, eliminative materialism, reductive materialism, and functionalism are each incompatible with such a dialogue—either because they ignore current brain knowledge, dismiss subjective experience, or treat the mind as a mere byproduct. Only emergentism, which holds that mental states depend on brain states yet possess properties beyond neurobiology, is compatible with a closer dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.