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William A Phillips

2 papers in the library · publishing 2018-2021

Papers

Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?

Neuroscience of Consciousness January 1, 2021 Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák, Talis Bachmann et al.

A theoretical account proposes that conscious perceptual experience depends on a specific cellular mechanism in the neocortex: apical amplification. Inputs to apical dendrites in layer 1 of many neocortical neurons integrate diverse contextual signals, which then amplify the transmission of sensory information arriving at the cell's basal synapses. This context-sensitive amplification makes perception more flexible and adaptive. The mechanism offers a way to implement recurrent processing without strong loops, supports global broadcasting while preserving individual cell contributions, and contributes to integrated information theory's holistic aspects. Because apical amplification relies on neuromodulators like acetylcholine and amines, it links specific conscious contents to global mental states and arousal fluctuations. The authors conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular basis for the context-sensitive selective amplification necessary for conscious perception.

Apical Function in Neocortical Pyramidal Cells: A Common Pathway by Which General Anesthetics Can Affect Mental State.

Frontiers in Neural Circuits January 1, 2018 William A Phillips, Talis Bachmann, Johan F. Storm

General anesthetics may suppress either the level of consciousness (arousal) or its contents (specific percepts, thoughts, feelings). This distinction is important for understanding both anesthesia and the neural bases of consciousness. Evidence indicates that both level and content depend on apical input to neocortical pyramidal cells, which selectively amplifies relevant signals. What these cells transmit information about can be separated from arousal levels controlled by sub-cortical nuclei and from prioritization set by thalamocortical interactions. The authors hypothesize that when conscious, we have particular directly experienced mental states, and that anesthetics disrupt the subcellular processes that selectively amplify contextually relevant activities.