The phenomenologist Edmund Husserl's methods, though not originally aimed at transpersonal experiences, can be applied to them. Husserl argued that science must be grounded in the study of perception to distinguish elements of experience originating from the environment from those projected by the mind. His techniques of reduction and epoché, which help achieve a 'phenomenological attitude', are explained. The relevance of these methods to transpersonal studies is demonstrated through examples: the Taylor-Hartelius debate in transpersonal psychology and the study of absorption states in transpersonal anthropology and cross-cultural religion.
This essay offers an anthropological perspective on a neuroepistemological account of mystical experience. It first describes features of mystical experience, such as distortions in time- and space-consciousness. It then examines the epistemology of mystical experience, focusing on the debate between constructivists and decontextualists. The authors develop a neuroepistemological framework and show how it might inform that debate. Finally, they discuss methodological challenges—like phenomenological naiveté—that can impede such an account, and outline the attributes needed in researchers to address these challenges.
A meta-analysis of 50 experimental dream-ESP studies from 1966 to 2016 found that dream content can be used to correctly identify target materials more often than chance. The overall effect size was small (0.20), and the combined result was statistically significant. Studies from the Maimonides Dream Lab showed a larger average effect (0.33) than independent studies (0.14), but this difference was not significant. No significant differences emerged between types of ESP, presence of senders, perceiver characteristics, or REM/non-REM monitoring. Effect sizes did not improve with study quality and declined over the 51-year period. The authors conclude the paradigm warrants continued investigation with design improvements.