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Freedom and Responsibility in Social and Individual Life: Adolf Reinach’s Influence on Edith Stein

Anna Jani

Pázmány Law Review November 13, 2026 DOI: 10.55019/plr.2026.1.131-144 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Reinach's theory of social acts provided Stein with a decisive framework that she transformed in three domains: communal life, political organization, and religious experience. Contends that Stein's account unifies freedom and responsibility through interpersonal, communal, political, and religious relations, and that Reinach's influence is best understood as a phenomenological impulse rather than the adoption of a finished doctrine.

Abstract

This article examines Adolf Reinach’s influence on Edith Stein’s phenomenology through the interconnected concepts of freedom and responsibility. It argues that Reinach’s theory of social acts provided Stein with a decisive conceptual framework that she subsequently transformed across three domains: communal life, political organization, and religious experience. Reinach’s analysis demonstrates how freely performed interpersonal acts, such as promising, can establish objective relations of obligation without eliminating the freedom of the acting person. Building on this insight, Stein develops an account of community in which supra-individual unity and collective responsibility remain grounded in the free acts and ultimate responsibility of individual persons. Her political philosophy extends this structure to the state, showing that authority and responsibility may be distributed or concentrated while remaining dependent upon personal agency and relations of representation and trust. Finally, Stein’s writings on grace reinterpret freedom as a responsive capacity through which the person may freely accept or reject the divine call. The article concludes that Reinach’s influence on Stein is best understood not as the adoption of a finished doctrine but as a phenomenological impulse that enabled her to articulate a unified account of freedom becoming responsibility through interpersonal, communal, political, and religious relations.