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Process Theories

Michael H Herzog, Aaron Schurger, Adrien Doerig

Cambridge University Press eBooks April 23, 2026 DOI: 10.1017/9781009244701.007 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Describes two computational accounts of consciousness: the global workspace theory, in which consciousness occurs when information is made widely available via a global neuronal workspace, and higher-order theories, in which consciousness occurs when a higher-order process describes a first-order sensory-cognitive process. The authors introduce the "small network argument", contending that extremely simple systems may meet process theories' criteria and thus would count as conscious.

Abstract

We portray processes theories which claim that consciousness is related to or identical with a computational process in the brain. The global workspace theory (GWT) proposes that consciousness occurs when information is made widely available via a global neuronal workspace. Higher order theories (HOTs) propose that consciousness occurs when there is a higher-order process that describes a first-order sensory-cognitive process. We will also introduce the ‘small network argument’, which holds that extremely simple systems may fulfil the criteria of process theories and hence would be considered conscious.