Dreaming, Self-Continuity, and Re-Coupling to Reality: A Phenomenological Hypothesis on Sleep, Early Consciousness Development, and Subjective Experience
Sabrina Schnellmann
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 10, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20111215 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Dreaming |
| Key points | Argues that the self persists through sleep in a different organizational mode, with dreams as internally stabilized subjective experience rather than symbolic imagery or neural noise. Proposes that waking and sleeping involve re-coupling internally generated and externally stabilized reality, drawing parallels with early development and boundary states of consciousness such as coma and minimally conscious states. |
Abstract
This paper develops the hypothesis that the self does not disappear during sleep, but instead transitions into a different mode of organization. Dreams are interpreted not primarily as symbolic imagery or neural noise, but as internally stabilized forms of subjective experience. The paper argues that the transition between sleeping and waking is less a shift between “consciousness off” and “consciousness on,” and more a re-coupling between internally generated and externally stabilized reality. Drawing from phenomenology, dream structure, and theories of minimal selfhood, the work explores parallels between dream states, early pre-linguistic development, and boundary states of consciousness such as coma and minimally conscious states. The central question becomes: What must remain preserved for subjective experience to continue — and what must occur for experience to reconnect itself to shared reality?