Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Epistemology
V. Hari Narayanan
Anthropology of Consciousness March 1, 2026 DOI: 10.1111/anoc.70033 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the testimonial/hermeneutic framework of epistemic injustice cannot adequately address injustice to Indigenous epistemology because Indigenous life understands self, mind, and knowledge differently. Proposes that Indigenous epistemology treats knowing as a process rather than knowledge as a product, and that doing justice to it requires a radically different kind of attention and embrace of a reality different from the usual one. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT: The article argues that current discussions on epistemic injustice, centered around the distinction between testimonial and hermeneutic types of injustice, cannot adequately deal with the injustice done to Indigenous epistemology. This happens primarily because of the significant difference in the way phenomena like self, mind, and knowledge are understood in Indigenous life. After discussing the salient features of Indigenous life, the article points out how the understanding of self, mind, and knowledge is interdependent in both Indigenous and Modern ways. Indigenous epistemology is primarily a matter of knowing and oriented towards a process rather than knowledge as a product. Treating knowing rather than knowledge as the basic epistemological category is not something that the Modern consciousness can do easily, given its tendency to find identity and satisfaction in the accumulation of knowledge. Thus, the article attempts to bring out the formidable difficulty in doing justice to the Indigenous ways of knowing by drawing attention to the need to employ a radically different kind of attention and embrace a reality different from the usual one.