Perspectival Uniqueness, the Individuation of Consciousness, and the Vertiginous 'Why Am I Me?'
George Goutos
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 6, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20052035 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a unique phenomenal first-person perspective is a primitive property tied to a continuous spacetime worldline rather than generated by the brain, with hindbrain coordination systems stabilizing and amplifying it while cortical networks provide variable contents. Contends that biological uniqueness is merely statistical and cannot ground first-person exclusivity, which is instead anchored in relativistic spacetime. Proposes testable predictions: loss and recovery of sentience should correlate more with deep coordination systems than cortical activity, and hindbrain timing disruptions should impair subjective unity, agency, and self-location. |
Abstract
This speculative paper develops a novel, interdisciplinary framework for the "Why am I me?" problem. It proposes that a unique phenomenal first-person perspective (PFPP) is not generated de novo by the brain, but is a primitive property that accompanies a single, continuous physical history: a spacetime worldline. Neural processes, particularly those of the hindbrain responsible for timing, prediction, and global coordination, function to stabilize and amplify this already fixed perspective, while cortical networks furnish the variable contents of perception, memory, and thought. The account argues that biological uniqueness is merely statistical and cannot ground the guaranteed exclusivity of first-person ownership. This exclusivity, it is suggested, is more plausibly anchored in the non-overlapping structure of relativistic spacetime itself. The proposal is explicitly conceptual and metaphysically speculative but is framed to yield testable empirical predictions. The loss and recovery of sentience should correlate more strongly with deep coordination systems than with cortical activity, and disruptions of hindbrain timing should specifically impair subjective unity, agency, and self-location. Failure of these predictions would falsify the view's core neural claims.