Editorial: Understanding consciousness: neural, cognitive, and philosophical perspectives

Abstract

Consciousness is a multifaceted phenomenon that scientists and philosophers have been striving to 11 understand for generations. At its core, the challenge is to provide a coherent explanation for the 12 phenomenal experiences characterizing our conscious inner lives and to reconcile phenomenal 13 qualities with the established framework of physics. Even though neuroscience has made great strides 14 in pinpointing the brain regions and neural activity patterns associated with conscious processes, 15 there are numerous competing interpretations of the empirical findings, reflecting a broad spectrum 16 of differing views on the nature of consciousness. Behind these differing views lie various 17 philosophical schools of thought that seek to integrate consciousness into our worldview. 18This Research Topic aims to combine new ideas from neuroscience, cognitive science, and 19 philosophy to address questions about the nature of subjective reality and the mechanisms underlying 20 the formation of conscious states. Such an interdisciplinary approach, which encompasses empirical 21 findings, theoretical models, and philosophical reflections, holds great potential for advancing our 22 understanding of consciousness. In this context, research on altered states and disorders of 23 consciousness is also relevant, as it provides additional insight into the principles behind conscious 24 processes. 25The Research Topic comprises six contributions, four of which discuss hypotheses and theories of 26 consciousness, while two articles focus on altered states or disorders of consciousness (AS/DOC). 27We will start with the theory-oriented contributions, followed by the AS/DOC-oriented articles. 28In "A neuroscientific hypothesis on the physical nature of consciousness," Ukachoke proposes that 29 consciousness is a specific form of neural information encoded in the spatiotemporal patterns of electrochemical signaling within certain neural circuits. By analyzing essential properties of 31 conscious experiences, such as their phenomenality, neural dependence, and first-person appearance, 32the study concludes that neural information is a suitable candidate for the foundation of 33 consciousness without the need to invoke new physics. The proposed hypothesis, which is intended 34 to serve as a parsimonious neuroscientific framework for understanding the physical nature of 35 awareness, overlaps significantly with many existing theories of consciousness, even though it differs 36 from them in conceptual details, focus, and explanatory scope. 37In their article "Naturalizing perceptual experience: the explanatory power of probabilistic computation and the holographic solution," Kirkeby-Hinrup and Stoll argue that consciousness can 39 be naturalized by explaining perceptual experience through the biophysical properties of cortical 40 neurons. Since cortical neurons operate probabilistically, driven partly by stochastic ion flux, the 41 authors model them as quantum systems whose ion-wave interference patterns generate holographic 42 reconstructions of sensory information. This "holography solution" proposes that phenomenal 43 content is a physical hologram produced during information processing in the cortex. The presented 44 approach challenges several established theories, but also shares similarities with existing models of 45 consciousness, particularly those based on predictive processing and the free energy principle. 46In "TEVSER: a theory of evolving self-representations," Pivovarov treats consciousness as a 47 structured and graded property emerging from progressively complex self-regulating systems. In 48 doing so, TEVSER does not view subjective experience as a product of self-representation but as its 49 inner aspect, i.e., as the way in which self-representation is experienced from within the system. A 50 living system maintains homeostasis through regulators, each containing internal models, the 51 integration of which forms hierarchical self-representations. The author argues that, as regulators 52 coordinate, organisms develop differentiated sensations, emotions, spatial and temporal subjectivity, 53 self-consciousness, and abstract symbolic reasoning. TEVSER overlaps with several existing 54 theories, in particular predictive coding, active inference, higher-order theories, and integrated 55 information theory (IIT). 56 Keppler takes a different approach in his contribution "Toward a true understanding of 57 consciousness: the explanatory power behind the non-physicalist paradigm." The author argues that a 58 powerful theory of consciousness must be both predictive and explanatory: it must specify the 59 conditions under which physical systems are capable of forming conscious states and explain why 60 these conditions give rise to conscious experience. Evaluating metaphysical paradigms shows that 61 physicalism, which treats consciousness as reducible to physical processes, can achieve strong 62 predictive power but cannot conclusively explain the emergence of phenomenal qualities. In contrast, 63 a theory grounded in the non-physicalist paradigm, which views consciousness as fundamental, is 64 demonstrated to offer both predictive and explanatory potential. This supports a paradigm shift 65 toward non-physicalism, reinterpreting neuroscientific findings within a more coherent framework. 66In his article "Oceanic states of consciousness-an existential-neuroscience perspective," Unterrainer 67 integrates psychoanalysis, existential philosophy, affective neuroscience, and psychedelic research to 68show how oceanic states can foster mystical insight and creativity. It is argued that oceanic 69 experiences, which involve ego dissolution, timelessness, and a sense of unity with the world, do not 70 reflect mere regression but a reorganization of self-processing.