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The consciousness-first commitment of integrated information theory.

Jeremiah Hendren

Neuroscience of Consciousness November 2, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niag074 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Integrated information theory Explanatory identity
Key points Argues that IIT's explanatory identity between experience and Φ-structures requires recalibrating scientific norms of explanation, because unlike "water is H2O", the explanandum is experience itself, which exists immediately and irrefutably, while claims about a world beyond experience are inferences within experience.

Abstract

Integrated information theory (IIT) accounts for consciousness through its explanatory identity: an experience (the explanandum) is identical to a causal structure (or Φ-structure, the explanans). In other identities in science (e.g. 'water is H2O'), the power of the explanans (H2O) comes from the presumption that it somehow exists more fundamentally. Yet when our explanandum is experience itself, as in IIT, we must recalibrate the norms of explanation to the fact that experience exists immediately and irrefutably, while whatever we may posit about the world beyond experience is always an inference within experience.

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