Mannison's Impossible Dream
Peter W. Preuss
Canadian Journal of Philosophy September 1, 1976 DOI: 10.1080/00455091.1976.10716164 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the philosophical campaign against mental images and the separate campaign against dreams are distinct, even though images and dreams appear closely related. Contends that analyses of mental imagery do not transfer to dreams: the claim that someone picturing his nursery resembles rather than observes a spectator of it may seem plausible for imagery but is nonsense when applied to dreaming. |
Abstract
Alastair Hannay wrote that there is a campaign against the mental image and a look at the philosophical literature on that topic bears him out. But there is also a campaign against dreams. Given the first campaign this is not surprising. What is surprising is that they are separate campaigns. Intuitively mental images and dreams seem to be as alike as kittens and cats, the one being merely the developed form of the other, made possible by the fading of consciousness of the real world. One would think that an attack on the one is also an attack on the other, at least in the sense that an analysis of the one will, with modest modifications, also be an analysis of the other. But this seems not to be so. To say that a man who pictured his nursery was not a spectator of a resemblance of his nursery, but rather resembled a. spectator of his nursery, may have some initial plausibility because some people behave in curious ways at such times. But to say this of a person who dreamt of his nursery is simply nonsense.