A Tale of Two Principles—Towards a Relational Perspective on the Free Energy Principle

Abstract

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) offers a physically grounded account of intentional properties in mind and life, framed in the context of Dynamical Systems Theory. Because of this generality, it was proposed as a formal basis to formalize the study of biological autonomy, autopoiesis, and enactive cognition. Yet, those approaches are centered by definition on describing how biological and cognitive agents are “laying down a path in walking”, or (re)constructing their own biological/cognitive structure through engagement with the world. Drawing from Rosen’s relational biology, we argue that such processes are by construction outside a “Newtonian” description in terms of well-defined observables and their dynamics. Rather, we draw from the thermodynamics of observation and biological computation to demonstrate the emergence of contextuality: the participatory production of observables against which the agent regulates their activity. We suggest a complementarity between Friston’s classical FEP and Fields’ relational FEP, describing, respectively, the dynamics within a biological/cognitive space and the construction of that space. Finally, we propose a structural realist understanding of this complementarity where both principles act on a physically embedded system of biological constraints, rather than an abstract mathematical space assumed to fully represent biological/cognitive organization.