What Is Consciousness? Non-Substantiality and Intermediacy in Kyoto School Philosophy
preprint DOI: 10.21203/rs.3.rs-11331118/v1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that everyday understanding objectifies consciousness as something one has or lacks, and that this objectification can enter scientific research and philosophical positions such as dualism, physicalism, and idealism. Drawing on Tanabe's critique of Nishida's "place of nothingness" and on "absolute mediation," the author proposes consciousness as "intermediary," existing only as mediated by body, world, and others, potentially relocating the problem of consciousness, including AI consciousness, to a field of concrete relations open to investigation. |
Abstract
Abstract Theories of consciousness are judged against ’the consciousness we know,’ our only reference point, yet this concept is taken for granted, though ambiguous. This paper argues that our everyday understanding of consciousness gives rise to its objectification, or quasi-substantialization, in ways so natural that they go unnoticed: consciousness comes to be treated as something one either has or lacks. Such an objectified concept may slip into scientific research, and various philosophical positions—dualism, physicalism, and idealism—likewise tend to treat consciousness as a substance, as something objectifiable, or as a positive ontological dimension. Against this background, I turn to two key figures of the Kyoto School. Kitarō Nishida, in his middle period, conceived of consciousness as the “place of nothingness,” deliberately distancing himself from any substantialist or objectifying conception while still regarding consciousness as the fundamental dimension that makes our reality what it is. Hajime Tanabe, however, criticized Nishida’s “place of nothingness” for positing the ultimate as something given rather than sought, and thus for risking the reinstatement of an ultimate that is the reverse of substance. Drawing on Tanabe’s philosophy of “absolute mediation,” I propose understanding consciousness as ‘intermediary’: neither a mere thing-like being nor an ultimate beyond all kinds of being, but what exists only as mediated by body, world, and others. Finally, I suggest that this view may relocate the problem of consciousness—including the question of AI consciousness—from an untouchable aporia to a field of concrete relations open to investigation.