James
Owen Flanagan, Heather Wallace
Routledge eBooks October 4, 2016 DOI: 10.4324/9781315678023-23 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that token physicalism—the view that each mental event is some brain or extended bodily event—is a legitimate regulative assumption for mind science and may be true, even though not every kind of mental event is the same kind of physical event (type physicalism). The author frames this as an emerging consensus among naturalists, with some notable exceptions. |
Abstract
The community of naturalists accepts that it is intuitively puzzling how phenomenal consciousness with its diaphanous texture could have emerged from matter and how it can now be realized in an abundance of sentient beings. Yet the prevailing consensus, with some notable exceptions, is that consciousness, like life, must have emerged diachronically from matter fi nding its way into new kinds of dynamic states; and that each mental state realized synchronically (seeing red now) must be some kind of material state in a brain, the body, or certain kinds of bodies-in-the world. In contemporary terms, there has been an emerging consensus that token physicalism is a legitimate regulative assumption for mind science, and, furthermore, it may very well be true: each and every mental event is some brain or extended bodily event, even if not every kind of mental event is the same kind of physical event ( type physicalism ).