A Wittgensteinian View of Artificial Intelligence 1
Otto Neumaier
Routledge eBooks May 15, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9781351141529-6 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Examines philosophical problems arising from claims that computers exhibit "intelligence" and "consciousness" and that they "simulate" human cognition. It presents Minsky's formulation of AI's aims, discusses Gödel's argument about the limits of formal logic and mathematics as a prominent objection to AI, and situates Wittgenstein's "philosophy of psychology" within behaviorist criticisms of introspectionist psychology. |
Abstract
This chapter deals with some philosophical problems connected with research in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), in particular with problems arising from two central claims, namely that computers exhibit &s;intelligence&s;, &s;consciousness&s; and other &s;inner&s; processes and that they &s;simulate&s; human &s;intelligence&s; and cognitive processes in general. The aims of AI have been formulated in different ways, the most prominent being the one by Marvin Minsky, who calls AI &s;the science of making machines do things that would require intelligence if done by men&s;. The most prominent argument against AI, which has been extensively discussed by philosophers, was introduced by Kurt Godel a long time before the &s;birth&s; of AI as a means to demonstrate the limits of formal logic and mathematics. Ludwig Wittgenstein&s;s &s;philosophy of psychology&s; originated within a context which was steeped in behaviorist criticisms of traditional, introspectionist psychology.