CRITIQUE OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

Abstract

This work presents a systematic critique of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, with special emphasis on two key but unexplained concepts: inner sense and the difference between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft). Starting from insights developed in the author's previous works – on consciousness as ontological space, mind as explicit instrument of information coordination, subject as bearer of transformation, and counterpoint as mechanism of self-organization – the work demonstrates that Kant's "inner sense" is not explained as an operative mechanism, but remains a mere named function. Likewise, the work demonstrates that Kant's distinction between understanding and reason has no explained ontological basis, but represents a formal distinction without mechanism. The work offers an alternative model in which "inner sense" is explained as a contrapuntal relationship of the subject toward its own states, and the difference between understanding and reason as a difference between instrument (mind) and source (intelligence). The critique is based on the methodological requirement that philosophical concepts must have operational explanations, not merely formal definitions. Keywords: Kant, transcendental aesthetic, inner sense, understanding, reason, intelligence, counterpoint, subject, transformation, critique