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Reframing the lived experience of persistent dizziness: insights from active inference

Marc A. Broberg, Mick Thacker, Karl John Friston, Jorge Eduardo Esteves

Frontiers in Psychology October 14, 2026 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1867836 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that persistent dizziness can be understood as an initial failure of sensory attenuation of vestibular and other prediction errors that becomes self-maintaining when the patient infers or learns that these errors cannot be resolved through action. Proposes that this process underwrites and is maintained by affective inference and an altered sense of agency, and uses this framework to support a holistic, person-centered clinical approach with complementary levels of therapeutic intervention.

Abstract

We present an active inference account of persistent dizziness predicated on models of enactivism and ecological psychology; including first-hand accounts of the patient’s lived experience. Mechanistically, we consider persistent dizziness to reflect an initial failure of sensory attenuation of vestibular and other sensory prediction errors. This failure becomes self-maintaining if the patient infers—or learns—that unattenuated prediction errors cannot be resolved through action. The ensuing formulation provides an integrative account of the pathophysiology of dizziness and how it underwrites—and is maintained by—affective inference and an altered sense of agency that shapes the experience of the person with dizziness. We foreground the holistic person-centered approach on offer from a clinical perspective, and consider complementary levels of therapeutic intervention under this theoretical framework.

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