INTEROCEPTION FROM THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE: STRATIFICATION OF INTEROCEPTIVE MODES, CRITIQUE OF PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO INTEROCEPTIVE STATES, AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIGITAL OBJECTIFICATION

Abstract

The article analyzes the epistemic status of interoception in the context of the classical philosophical critique of privileged access to interoceptive states and contemporary technologies of bodily objectification. The author argues that interoception is not monolithic but stratified into two modes. The first, basic mode is an autonomous, nonintentional flow of homeostatic signals. The second, eventbased mode includes vivid intentional experiences such as pain and hunger. This distinction is rooted in H. Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, specifically in the concept of eccentric positionality. It allows us to reconsider the arguments of G. Ryle, D. Dennett, and externalists, in particular H. Putnam and T. Burge. It is shown that the critical arguments of G. Ryle, D. Dennett, and the externalists are directed exclusively at the event-based mode and do not affect basic interoception, which remains elusive to introspection, yet it is basic interoception that grounds the very possibility of experience. The article also examines the role of language as a tool for the social verification of interoceptive experience. The dual function of language is revealed, namely the verification of eventbased interoception and the constitution of the background bodily horizon. Further, the transition from linguistic representation to digital profiling is considered, and the concept of data behaviourism is introduced, denoting a methodological stance whereby bodily data are recorded and used to predict behaviour without recourse to subjective experience; the application of this stance is demonstrated through examples from medicine, education, and fitness. Then the author turns to the notion of algorithmic psychometry, that is, the extraction of data about mental states from bodily behaviour. This notion makes it possible to show that without stratification of interoception into basic and event-based modes, such psychometry leads to a confusion of the corresponding ontological levels – the basic and the event-based. The author concludes that, despite the growing externalisability of bodily signals, the basic bodily feeling retains its ontological irreducibility, being reducible neither to introspective report nor to digital data. This reveals the limits of applicability of digital methods in the study of the body. In perspective, the work opens opportunities for empirical research using the proposed distinction to test hypotheses about eventbased and basic interoception, as well as for ethical reflection on the digital objectification of the body.