Wittgenstein and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
William Child
Philosophy October 2, 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819126101557 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues against Wiseman's revisionary interpretation, defending the standard reading on which Wittgenstein distinguishes 'I' as object, which involves recognition of a person and is vulnerable to misidentification errors, from 'I' as subject, which involves no such recognition and is immune to such errors. The paper contends this reading fits Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism and that the conception of self-consciousness it involves is defensible. |
Abstract
Abstract: Rachael Wiseman (2019) has challenged the standard understanding of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book discussion of ‘two different cases in the use of the word “I”’. Wittgenstein is standardly read as identifying an important distinction between the use of ‘I’ as object, which involves the recognition of a person and is vulnerable to errors of misidentification, and the use of ‘I’ as subject, which involves no recognition of a person and is immune to error through misidentification. Wiseman argues that Wittgenstein does not in fact endorse such a distinction but warns against it. She contends that the standard interpretation ignores the context of the passage in the Blue Book discussion of solipsism and that it misunderstands the nature of self-consciousness. This paper defends the standard reading of Wittgenstein against Wiseman’s revisionary interpretation. It shows how it fits with his discussion of solipsism. And it defends the conception of self-consciousness it involves.