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Post-action determinants of the reported time of conscious intentions.

Davide Rigoni, Marcel Brass, Giuseppe Sartori

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2010 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00038 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Event-related potential (ERP) experiment Peer reviewed
Measures will judgment (W), action-effect negativity (N(AE))
Keywords Action-effect negativity Action-monitoring Conscious decisions Free will Intentions
Key findings The authors report that delayed auditory feedback after a button press evoked an action-effect negativity (N(AE)) at 250-300 ms whose amplitude increased with longer feedback delays, and that changes in N(AE) were associated with changes in the reported time of the decision to act. They argue this indicates the subjective timing of conscious intention is influenced by an action-monitoring system that detects mismatches between predicted and actual sensory consequences.

Abstract

The question of whether our behavior is guided by our conscious intentions is gaining momentum within the field of cognitive neuroscience. It has been demonstrated that the subjective experience that conscious intentions are the driving force of our actions, is built partially on a post hoc reconstruction. Our hypothesis was that this reconstructive process is mediated by an action-monitoring system that compares the predicted and the actual sensory consequences of an action. We applied event-related potentials (ERP) to a variant of the Libet's task in which participants were asked to press a button and to report the time of decision - will judgment (W) - to press. We provided delayed auditory feedbacks after participants' action to signify an action time later than the actual action. We found that auditory feedbacks evoked a negative component in the 250-300 time range, namely action-effect negativity (N(AE)), that is thought to reflect the activity of a system that detects violation from expectancies. We showed that the amplitude of the N(AE) was sensitive to the delay of the auditory feedback, with a larger amplitude for more delayed feedbacks. Furthermore, changes in the N(AE) were also associated with changes in the reported W. These results not only confirm that we infer the time we decided to act from events occurring after the response, but these results also indicate that the subjective experience of when an action is decided is influenced by the activity of an action-monitoring system that detects mismatches between predicted and actual sensory consequences of the actions.

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